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The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the 
General Issue of Civil Liberties* 
By WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE t 
ABSTRACT: Academic freedom has been blurred in law and 
in popular usage. Its clarification should enable the Supreme 
Court to grant it explicit protection under the Constitution 
as an identifiable subset of First Amendment freedoms. Its 
identification with the professional endeavors of faculty mem- 
bers, moreover, should reduce the tendency of institutions to 
intrude upon the aprofessional personal liberties of the faculty 
even while adequately protecting the extramural professional 
pursuits of the faculty and assuring them of equal protection in 
their interests as private citizens. Adjustments of standards 
by the American Association of University Professors, more 
definitely distinguishing the special accountability of faculty 
members for the integrity of their professional endeavors from 
their roles as private citizens, is long overdue. 
William Van Alstyne is Professor of Law at Duke University. He is past General 
Counsel of the American Association of University Professors and currently serves 
as Chairman of Committee A on academic freedom and tenure. 
* This article is the revised product of a manuscript presented in the course of a symposium 
on academic freedom in the spring of 1972 at the University of Texas, under a grant from 
the Council of Learned Societies. The author is especially grateful to Professor Edmund 
Pincoffs for his support and encouragement and to the several participants whose comments 
provided the basis for certain revisions. It is not possible accurately to credit the various 
sources that have helped to inform this essay, especially those that did so indirectly, that is, 
in espousing quite different views of academic freedom than those offered here. Most espe- 
cially helpful in thinking about the subject, however, were the many Committee A Case 
Reports scattered throughout the volumes of the American Association of University Pro- 
fessors (AAUP) Bulletin, the brief essay by Arthur Lovejoy in Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences (1937), s.v. "academic freedom," the splendid volume by Richard Hofstadter and 
Walter Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Co- 
lumbia University Press, 1955), and Fritz Machlup's trenchant address, "On Some Misconcep- 
tions Concerning Academic Freedom," AAUP Bulletin 41 (1955), p. 753. There were several 
other very helpful materials too numerous to mention here. 
t Because portions of this essay bear directly on certain standards of the American Asso- 
ciation of University Professors (AAUP), it is of more than customary importance to stress 
that my statement of views is wholly personal. 
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AHALF-CENTURY ago, the Con- 
stitution was misconstrued to pro- 
vide no positive law support for John 
Stuart Mill's Essay on Liberty. Inso- 
far as the free exercise of political lib- 
erty was tied to a job, neither profes- 
sors nor policemen could safely pursue 
their civil liberties without anxiety that 
they would be fired. The utter inse- 
curity of liberty and status, even 
against abridgments by government 
itself, was underscored by the laconic 
dictum of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
in 1892: 
The petitioner may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no consti- 
tutional right to be a policeman .... 
There are few employments for hire in 
which the servant does not agree to sus- 
pend his constitutional right of free speech, 
as well as of idleness, by the implied terms 
of his contract. The servant cannot com- 
plain, as he takes the employment on the 
terms which are offered him.1 
The point was not lost on the academic 
profession in the dismal outcome of the 
Scopes Monkey trial, in 1927: 
[Scopes] had no right or privilege to serve 
the state except upon such terms as the 
state prescribed. ... In dealing with its 
own employees engaged upon its own work, 
the state is not hampered by the limita- 
tions of ... the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.2 
AN OVERVIEW 
It was exactly during this same pe- 
riod that American professors, familiar 
with the tradition and values of Lehr- 
freiheit in German universities, began 
to domesticate it and to propound the 
concept of "academic freedom" as a 
principle worthy of general respect to 
fill up the void of the positive law in 
this country. Given the circumstances 
1. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892). 
2. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111-12, 
289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927). 
-given the surprising success of the 
infant American Association of Univer- 
sity Professors (AAUP), founded in 
1915 and at once startled by the extent 
to which its good offices were sought 
by aggrieved faculty members-it is 
not remarkable that an ineluctable tend- 
ency developed to expand upon aca- 
demic freedom to make it perform a 
larger service. From the solid and 
fortified arguments sustaining academic 
freedom as a logical imperative if acade- 
micians were to fulfill the cardinal ex- 
pectation laid upon their professional 
employment, the principle was pressed 
into the larger field of civil liberties 
whether or not such liberties were pro- 
fessionally linked. In the absence of 
other sources of employment security 
protecting professors from dismissal in 
pursuing conventional political activities 
off-the-job and on their own time, or 
entering into ordinary public assemblies 
and taking personal positions on social 
issues simply as private citizens and not 
as professional scholars or researchers, 
academic freedom offered itself as an 
irresistibly attractive umbrella. Gradu- 
ally, the phrase slipped away from a 
close association with protection of the 
academic in his professional endeavors 
and assumed a new synonymy with the 
general civil liberties of academics- 
and especially their general political 
liberties. Accordingly, the protection 
of an academic in respect to the exercise 
of his aprofessional political liberties 
was argued into position as a subset of 
academic freedom. The effort so far 
succeeded that it has long been routine 
for AAUP Committee A Reports to de- 
scribe the dismissal of professors on ac- 
count of aprofessional political activity 
as a violation of their "academic free- 
dom." Professor Fritz Machlup accu- 
rately reports the situation in the new 
Encyclopaedia of Higher Education: 
"Academic freedom (in its modem con- 
ception, though not in the past) in- 
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cludes the right of the academic indi- 
vidual to engage in political activity." 3 
Damaging to the profession 
It is the seemingly small and reac- 
tionary purpose of this essay to suggest 
that this development in the usage of 
academic freedom was never sound and 
that it ought now to be abandoned. 
Far from continuing to be helpful to 
the profession, moreover, I believe the 
continued use of the phrase in this 
expanded sense is damaging to the 
profession in three important ways. 
First, the ubiquitousness of indiscrim- 
inate claims to academic freedom, in 
respect to aprofessional political activ- 
ity, provides substance to a widespread 
belief that the professoriat sees itself as 
an extraordinary elite, since we tend to 
associate our claim to protection not 
with the general case for civil liberties, 
but rather as a special case or subset 
of academic freedom. As implied in the 
following observation by Glenn Morrow 
in his effort to rationalize the de- 
fense of academic freedom, the sprawl- 
ing claim seems, without reason, to 
be indifferent to the indistinguishable 
predicament of other citizens: 
The justification of academic freedom 
cannot be based merely on the right to 
freedom of thought and expression en- 
joyed by all citizens of a liberal society, 
for academic freedom implies immunity to 
some natural consequences of free speech 
that the ordinary citizen does not enjoy. 
An ordinary citizen who expresses un- 
popular opinions may lose customers if 
he is a merchant, clients if he is a lawyer, 
patients if he is a physician, advertisers 
or subscribers if he is the editor of a news- 
paper, or suffer other forms of social or 
economic penalty resulting from disap- 
proval of his expressed opinion.... 
The justification of academic freedom 
must therefore be sought in the peculiar 
3. Fritz Machlup, "Academic Freedom," 
Encyclopaedia of Higher Education (1972), 
vol. 1, pp. 6, 8. 
character and function of the university 
scholar.4 
The obvious point is that others who 
work for a living may also wish to af- 
filiate with unpopular causes or to speak 
freely about political issues of the day 
without reference to their regular work 
or professional endeavors, sometimes, 
as in our own case, even in sharp op- 
position to the known wishes of the 
institutional employer. Manifestly, it 
must-and does-strike them as odd 
that professors nevertheless insist on 
having an extra right to be protected 
in these aprofessional pursuits and to 
do such things-a claim which is sub- 
limely stronger than their own. Pro- 
fessors insist that such activities are 
part of their academic freedom and a 
special contribution to the social good; 
whereas such activities by others are 
merely an ordinary matter of common 
liberty to be tolerated in a liberal so- 
ciety but not, of course, of the same 
rank of special social good as the 
protection of academic freedom. 
The consequent tendency of class 
cleavage and cost in good will that I 
wish to emphasize, however, is not 
simply the apparent and suspect elitism 
of our claim; for if the claim were well 
taken, it would be a sufficient answer 
that we must simply try harder to per- 
suade a larger public that it is indeed 
a correct one. Rather, the price we 
pay is the much greater cost of the lad 
who cried "wolf" so often when it was 
false that few would pay attention when 
it was true: an errant claim of academic 
freedom obscures the vital importance 
of academic freedom as more modestly 
conceived and thereby engenders public 
indifference even when an authentic 
issue of academic freedom is clearly and 
unmistakably involved. I mean to 
4. Glenn Morrow, "Academic Freedom," 
Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1968), vol. 
1, pp. 4, 6. 
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argue, of course, that while a profes- 
sor's ordinary freedom of speech is not 
a subset of his academic freedom, aca- 
demic freedom is itself a special sub- 
set of First Amendment freedoms. Its 
importance as a special subset is likely 
to be obscured and ignored, however, 
if we ourselves do not hold to the 
distinction. 
Postponed constitutional status 
Second, although I cannot prove the 
correctness of the impression, I believe 
that the earlier and errant expansion of 
academic freedom claims beyond the 
boundaries of its core rationale has in- 
advertently delayed the specific assimi- 
lation of academic freedom into consti- 
tutional law. In 1958, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the First Amendment 
in a manner to provide separate and 
distinct protection for freedom of asso- 
ciation, deriving the sense and sub- 
stance of that freedom from three other 
clauses-those dealing with freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly, and the 
right to petition for redress of griev- 
ances-but nevertheless marking it with 
a character of its own with certain 
instrumental features different from 
those of its parent clauses.5 Nothing 
equivalent has yet developed in respect 
5. See M. W. Solter, "Freedom of Associa- 
tion-A New and Fundamental Civil Right," 
George Washington Law Review 27 (1959), 
p. 653; T. Emerson, "Freedom of Association 
and Freedom of Expression," Yale Law Jour- 
nal 74 (1964), p. 1. The initial case was 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), 
which on its face required but the slightest 
extension of free speech and assembly prece- 
dents. By the time additional cases involving 
quite different interests had been decided, 
clearly it had become more useful and accu- 
rate to speak of a distinctive freedom of 
association. See, for example, N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 
372 U.S. 529 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 
(1964). 
to academic freedom, however, in spite 
of the fact that the Court has often 
made highly honorable mention of the 
phrase in the adjudication of First 
Amendment claims.6 The prolonged 
* 6. The Supreme Court has often adverted 
to academic freedom in dicta. See, for ex- 
ample, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967): "Our Nation is deeply 
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us 
and not merely to the teachers concerned. 
That freedom is therefore a special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate 
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom"; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965): "[T]he State may not, con- 
sistently with the spirit of the First Amend- 
ment, contract the spectrum of available 
knowledge. The right of freedom of speech 
and press includes not only the right to utter 
or to print, but the right to distribute, the 
right to receive, the right to read . . . and 
freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and 
freedom to teach . . .-indeed the freedom of 
the entire university community"; Barenblatt 
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959): 
"When academic teaching-freedom and its 
corollary learning-freedom, so essential to the 
well-being of the Nation, are claimed this 
Court will always be on the alert against 
intrusion by Congress into this constitution- 
ally protected domain"; Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51, 261-64 
(1957): "The essentiality of freedom in the 
community of American universities is almost 
self-evident. No one should underestimate 
the vital role in a democracy that is played 
by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
leaders in our colleges and universities would 
imperil the future of our Nation. . 
Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to 
gain new maturity and understanding; other- 
wise our civilization will stagnate and die. 
. . . We do not now conceive of any cir- 
cumstance wherein a state interest would 
justify infringement of rights in this field"; 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195-98 
(1952): "By limiting the power of the States 
to interfere with freedom of speech and 
freedom of inquiry and freedom of associa- 
tion, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all 
persons, no matter what their calling. But, in 
view of the nature of the teacher's relation 
to the effective exercise of the rights which 
are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by 
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gestation of academic freedom as an 
identifiable First Amendment claim, a 
special subset of vocational freedoms 
the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of 
freedom of thought, and of action upon 
thought, in the case of teachers brings the 
safeguards of those amendments vividly into 
operation. . . . They must have the freedom 
of responsible inquiry, by thought and ac- 
tion, into the meaning of social and economic 
ideas, into the checked history of social and 
economic dogma. They must be free to sift 
evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and 
circumstance, from that restless, enduring 
process of extending the bounds of under- 
standing and wisdom, to assure which the 
freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of 
worship are guaranteed by the Constitution 
of the United States against infraction by 
National or State government. The functions 
of educational institutions in our national life 
and the conditions under which alone they 
can adequately perform them are at the basis 
of these limitations upon State and National 
power"; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 
(1960): "The vigilant protection of constitu- 
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools"; White- 
hill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59-60 (1967): 
"We are in the First Amendment field. The 
continuing surveillance which this type of 
law places on teachers is hostile to academic 
freedom." 
Additionally, a number of writers have 
previously urged the judiciary to acknowledge 
a separately identifiable First Amendment 
right to academic freedom. See, for example, 
W. Murphy, "Academic Freedom-An Emerg- 
ing Constitutional Right," Law and Con- 
temporary Problems 28 (1963), p. 447; T. 
Emerson and D. Haber, "Academic Freedom 
of the Faculty Member as Citizen," ibid., p. 
525; David Fellman, "Academic Freedom in 
American Law," Wisconsin Law Review 1961 
(1961), p. 3; W. Van Alstyne, "The Con- 
stitutional Rights of Teachers and Profes- 
sors," Duke Law Journal (1970), p. 841. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that closure between 
the First Amendment and a distinct right of 
academic freedom has not yet been made. 
The current situation is summed up in Justice 
Holmes' observation about the work of a 
colleague: "I used to say that he had a power- 
ful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got 
nearer than two inches to each other." 
[Quoted in E. J. Bander, ed., Justice Holmes, 
Ex Cathedra (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie, 
1966), p. 235.] 
readily derived from, but not simply 
fungible with, freedom of speech doc- 
trine or general First Amendment doc- 
trine in respect to public employees, 
may ironically be the consequence of 
our own previous tendencies to blur the 
distinctions. In possession of a per- 
suasive justification in defense of aca- 
demic freedom, and finding the general 
protection of other civil liberties so 
hopelessly inadequate in respect to the 
security of employment and the exer- 
cise of free speech in general, we too 
expediently extended the rhetoric of aca- 
demic freedom to press for additional 
degrees of protection which other kinds 
of employees were denied at the time. 
The cost of the inaccuracy, however, 
has been the indefinite postponement of 
constitutional status for academic free- 
dom as a separate, albeit limited, 
First Amendment right. The chances 
for the specific constitutional protection 
The lack of closure is illustrated by Epper- 
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 397 (1968), invali- 
dating a state criminal statute prohibiting 
public school teachers from adverting to any 
theory regarding the origin of man not con- 
sistent with the Bible. Despite the Court's 
many previous references to academic free- 
dom, Mr. Justice Black saw no substantive 
difficulty with the statute and concurred in 
the result solely because he thought the 
statute to be impermissibly vague, that is, as 
a criminal statute it provided insufficient 
notice of the exact conduct teachers were 
expected to avoid. [See also his dissenting 
in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 521-22 (1969).] While disagreeing 
that this was the sole fault of the statute, 
Mr. Justice Steward suggested only that the 
statute raised a substantial question in light 
of "guarantees of free communication con- 
tained in the First Amendment," that is, a 
general free speech issue without any more 
specialized features peculiar to academic free- 
dom. The Opinion for the Court went no 
further, moreover, than to hold the statute 
invalid as a violation of the religious estab- 
lishment clause-leaving one to wonder 
whether the case has any significance at all 
beyond the religion-related novelty of the 
particular kind of statute involved in the case. 
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of academic freedoms, as a subset of 
First Amendment rights, would very 
likely be improved if we ourselves had 
managed to respect the difference. 
Third, there is a marvelous irony in 
the fact that the condition of constitu- 
tional law has not remained static since 
the policeman's case of 1892, or the 
Scopes case of 1927. Rather, the ex- 
tent of positive law protection of public 
employees in general now extends fully 
to threats against their employment in 
retaliation for the exercise of freedom 
of speech, and not merely to threats of 
fines or jail. The point was again 
made by the Supreme Court during 
this most recent term, clearly reiterating 
that even simple nonrenewal of an un- 
tenured faculty member by a public 
institution would violate the First 
Amendment if it was premised upon 
personal political activity otherwise 
protected by that amendment: 
The first question presented is whether 
the respondent's lack of a contractual or 
tenure right to re-employment, taken 
alone, defeats his claim that the non- 
renewal of his contract violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold 
that it does not.7 
Even more, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that a teacher would be so 
greatly inhibited vis-a-vis other citizens 
were he constrained by a strict profes- 
sional standard of care, accuracy, and 
courtesy in the rough-and-tumble of 
ordinary political discussion that the 
First Amendment will protect his em- 
ployment from jeopardy where his de- 
parture from that standard related only 
to his aprofessional political utterances 
as a citizen, and not to his teaching, 
research, professional publication, or to 
similar institutional responsibilities of 
7. Perry v. Sindermann, US. Law Week 40 
(1972), pp. 5087, 5088. See also W. Van 
Alstyne, "The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law," Harvard 
Law Review 81 (1968), p. 1439. 
a professional character.8 Not only has 
the practical reason which provided the 
incentive-if not a compelling logic- 
for the earlier view that an academic's 
civil liberties are a specific subset of 
his academic freedom been largely re- 
moved,9 therefore, but the continued 
insistence upon that view may even 
work against the equal protection of 
professors as citizens. In having rested 
the right of the academic to pursue 
ordinary political activity specifically as 
a manifestation of his academic free- 
dom, we have invited institutional em- 
ployers to interest themselves in the 
"professionalism" which the academic 
employee reflects in that activity. The 
wooden insistence that academic free- 
dom is at the heart of an academic's 
right to engage in political activity has 
repeatedly drawn the sharp riposte that, 
given this rationale, the political liber- 
ties of academics must be correspond- 
ingly reviewed by a higher standard- 
8. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
U.S. 563 (1968), and see discussion in text at 
n. 16 p. 153, of this article. 
9. "Largely" is used advisedly in acknowl- 
edgment of the fact that neither the Bill of 
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment is 
applicable to institutions uninvolved with 
government. For a consideration of this 
issue, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au- 
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. 
Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Cole- 
man v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1121 (2d 
Cir. 1970); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Brown, 392 F.2d 
120 (3rd Cir. 1968), aff'g 270 F. Supp. 782 
(E.D. Pa. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 
(1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia 
University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 
Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 
609 (D.D.C. 1967), dismissed as moot, 412 
F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Guillory v. Ad- 
ministration of Tulane University, 203 F. 
Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacated, 207 F. Supp. 
554, aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962). See 
also R. O'Neil, "Private Universities and Pub- 
lic Law," Buffalo Law Review 19 (1970), p. 
155; R. Schubert, "State Action and the Pri- 
vate University," Rutgers Law Review 24 
(1970), p. 323. 
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that is, a professional standard-than 
the like activities of others It thus pre- 
sumes to make professors subject to a 
greater degree of overall employment 
accountability than others generally 
owe in respect to their private freedom, 
virtually as an elitist's concession of 
noblesse oblige given in exchange for 
the special academic freedom claim: 
that the claim of general civil liberty 
by academics is more important to so- 
ciety than the claim of general civil 
liberty of others. The instances in 
which educational institutions have 
acted on this concession are legion, as 
many of the published Committee A 
reports attest. Respectfully, I do not 
think we can avoid some shared re- 
sponsibility for this unhappy tendency, 
given our past practice of claiming so 
much for academic freedom and so little 
for civil liberty. We may hope to get 
out of this thicket more swiftly, how- 
ever, by returning to the fundamentals 
of academic freedom and simultane- 
ously insisting upon the uniform and 
robust protection of civil liberties. 
The proposition that academic free- 
dom is a special subset of First Amend- 
ment freedoms, but that it is distin- 
guishable from other civil liberties, 
necessarily means that it is not uni- 
formly available in defense of a teach- 
er's or scholar's purely aprofessional 
pursuits, including even some involving 
his general freedom of speech. The 
acknowledgment that this is so, how- 
ever, is not meant to imply that we 
lack a suitable forensic or constitutional 
basis to secure these other liberties 
from institutional or legislative abridg- 
ment, or that the AAUP should be less 
vigilant than it has been in reporting 
conditions in higher education inimical 
to those liberties. Indeed, I mean to 
argue that in certain important re- 
spects, exactly the converse is more 
nearly true: that the special constraints 
of academic freedom cannot be invoked 
to arrest that latitude of general free 
speech and personal liberty teachers are 
fully entitled to enjoy as citizens on 
equal terms with all other citizens, free 
from any intrusion of institutional or 
legislative power associated solely with 
their academic and job-related respon- 
sibilities. The legitimate claims of per- 
sonal autonomy possessed equally by 
all persons, wholly without reference to 
academic freedom, frame a distinct and 
separate set of limitations upon the just 
power of an institution to use its lever- 
age of control. More than the profes- 
sion may generally know (and far more 
than an undifferentiated theory of aca- 
demic freedom-with its excess baggage 
of general responsibility-may itself 
allow), moreover, the judicial recogni- 
tion of these general limitations upon 
institutional authority has already 
taken hold. Part of this essay will at- 
tempt to make the case that the specific 
theory of academic freedom is entirely 
congenial to this welcome development 
in constitutional law and that it may 
contribute far more toward the equal 
treatment of teachers and scholars in 
the enjoyment of their personal liberties 
than the less discriminating theory 
which treats an academic's political 
freedom as a subset of his academic 
freedom. 
THE DEFINITION, RATIONALE, AND 
SYSTEM OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The phrase "academic freedom," in 
the context "the academic freedom of 
a faculty member of an institution of 
higher learning," refers to a set of voca- 
tional liberties: to teach, to investigate, 
to do research, and to publish on any 
subject as a matter of professional 
interest, without vocational jeopardy or 
threat of other sanction, save only upon 
adequate demonstration of an inexcus- 
able breach of professional ethics in 
the exercise of any of them. Specifi- 
cally, that which sets academic freedom 
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apart as a distinct freedom is its voca- 
tional claim of special and limited 
accountability in respect to all academi- 
cally related pursuits of the teacher- 
scholar: an accountability not to any 
institutional or societal standard of 
economic benefit, acceptable interest, 
right thinking, or socially constructive 
theory, but solely to a fiduciary stan- 
dard of professional integrity. To con- 
dition the employment or personal free- 
dom of the teacher-scholar upon the 
institutional or societal approval of his 
academic investigations or utterances, 
or to qualify either even by the im- 
mediate impact of his professional en- 
deavors upon the economic well-being 
or good will of the very institution 
which employs him, is to abridge his 
academic freedom. The maintenance 
of academic freedom contemplates an 
accountability in respect to academic 
investigations and utterances solely in 
respect of their professional integrity, 
a matter usually determined by refer- 
ence to professional ethical standards of 
truthful disclosure and reasonable care. 
Academic freedom is a "freedom"- 
rather than a "right"-in the sense that 
it establishes an immunity from the 
power of others to use their authority 
to restrain its exercise without, how- 
ever, necessarily commanding a right of 
institutional subsidy for every object 
of professional endeavor that might en- 
gage the interest of the individual pro- 
fessor. In cleaving to a limited program 
or in husbanding its scarce financial 
resources, for instance, the decision of 
an institution not to offer a particular 
subject or not, itself, to provide means 
for a particular line of research may be 
faulted as educationally unenlightened, 
but it would not, on that account, 
constitute an abridgment of academic 
freedom. At the same time, however, 
academic freedom would be abridged 
were any form of sanction threatened 
against a faculty member because of 
any of his professional pursuits, even 
assuming that the individual's interest 
pertained to a subject that the institu- 
tion declines itself to support and may 
thoroughly disapprove. A principle of 
educational pluralism may excuse an 
act of institutional parochialism in what 
it is prepared to offer as an institution 
of higher learning, but the principle of 
academic freedom clearly condemns any 
act of institutional censure in respect 
to the professional endeavors of its 
faculty, assuming only no failing of 
professional integrity in the pursuit of 
those endeavors. Similarly, academic 
freedom protects the vocational discre- 
tion of faculty members to conduct 
whatever instruction and research they 
may be retained to provide consistent 
with standards of professional integrity. 
Three cases 
We may concretely illustrate the sev- 
eral foregoing observations by briefly 
stating three cases, all of which lie 
easily within the uniform protection of 
academic freedom: 
Case 1. A faculty member is as- 
signed to teach a course in biology in- 
clusive of theories respecting the origin 
of man. A state law provides that a 
teacher may be fired and fined if he 
adverts to any theory of evolution or 
point of view respecting the origin of 
man inconsistent with the literal story 
of Genesis. The law is an infringement 
of the teacher's academic freedom inso- 
far as it forecloses a professionally 
responsible treatment of the subject.'0 
Case 2. An English professor assigns 
a particular short story to give her stu- 
dents a better understanding of one 
genre of Western literature. Conceding 
that the professor's ability and particu- 
lar treatment of the subject are above 
10. Compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97 (1968), discussed in n. 6. 
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reproach, the president of the college 
nonetheless admonishes her to discon- 
tinue the assignment because in his 
judgment the story is garbage, the phi- 
losophy of the story is destructive, and 
because several parents have com- 
plained. Following her statement that 
she believes she has a responsibility to 
teach the story consistent with a pro- 
fessional treatment of the subject she 
has been engaged to teach, she is fired. 
Her dismissal clearly violated her aca- 
demic freedom, assuming only that her 
selection of the story was not other- 
wise a clearly inappropriate profes- 
sional means of fulfilling her academic 
responsibilities.11 
Case 3. A professor of anthropology, 
interested also in genetics, prepares a 
paper which he presents before an off- 
campus symposium in which he reviews 
the basis for a particular hypothesis- 
that significant evidence suggests the 
inheritability of variable intelligence 
linked to race. Although his utterances 
are extramural, they are clearly aca- 
demic in character. Assuming only 
that he has been guilty of no failure 
of professional integrity in the manner 
in which he has presented his hypothe- 
ses, his conduct is fully protected by 
fundamental principles of academic 
freedom. Accordingly, no matter how 
unpopular, distasteful, socially destruc- 
tive, or embarrassing his extramural 
presentation may seem to the univer- 
sity where he is employed, no action 
may appropriately be taken against 
him.12 
The mechanism in common use in the 
United States for the protection of aca- 
11. Compare Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. 
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970), possibly the 
first decision clearly identifying academic 
freedom as a separate and distinct First 
Amendment freedom. 
12. The similarity of this hypothetical to 
news accounts of Professor Arthur Jensen's 
work is, of course, not accidental. 
demic freedom reflects the political and 
institutional circumstances of the aca- 
demic profession in this country. Were 
teachers and scholars sole practitioners, 
certified by licensure agencies in the 
manner of doctors or lawyers, we might 
expect that questions of professional 
integrity would be reserved primarily 
to these agencies-otherwise leaving 
to individual clients or educational 
"customers" the separate determination 
of whether each teacher or scholar is 
good enough in his profession to war- 
rant being retained as an educational 
mentor or as an independent contractor 
to engage in research. There are no 
such agencies in higher education as in 
law and medicine, however, and one 
will tend to starve as a sole practitioner. 
Nor is today's academy at all like the 
original Akademeia-simply a place on 
the outskirts of Athens where Plato 
could be found by anyone interested in 
his professions. Neither are univer- 
sities under the benign protection of 
powerful autocrats, such as a German 
prince or a powerful ecclesiastical or- 
ganization which, while brooking no 
academic freedom at all for criticism of 
themselves or of the doctrines associ- 
ated with their power, might otherwise 
offer protection against the hostilities of 
all others. Nor are entire faculties in 
this country endowed as Oxford or 
Cambridge with sufficient assets that 
the faculties may largely control their 
own situation. 
Rather, it is all very familiar that 
the academic profession is practiced in 
this country in association with public 
and private educational enterprises: 
that one's capacity for the exercise of 
academic freedom is inextricably tied 
to his university employment, that the 
ultimate financial resources of the insti- 
tution are largely beyond the control 
of the faculty, that ultimate managerial 
responsibility is not lodged within the 
faculty, and that issues of professional 
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integrity are resolved not by licensure 
or professional associations in the main, 
but within each institution-at least in 
the first instance. Insofar as public 
institutions are concerned, the power 
of the demos to force hemlock upon a 
modern Socrates is constrained by the 
Constitution-indeed, the power of the 
people even to secure an end to his 
academic freedom by having him fired 
is thus constrained. In the develop- 
ment of a more general mechanism 
within each institution for protecting 
academic freedom, however, no satis- 
factory reason has been given to dis- 
tinguish between the two kinds of aca- 
demic institutions-public and private. 
The fact that the Constitution makes 
such a distinction for purposes of 
positive law is largely beside the point. 
In the absence of state, regional, or 
national professional licensure agencies 
composed of professional teachers and 
scholars, the mechanism of professional 
accountability common in the United 
States has gradually developed through 
the utilization of standing faculty com- 
mittees within each institution in 
which the professional teacher or 
scholar is employed. Consistent with 
what we have already said about aca- 
demic freedom, however, the charge of 
each such committee is strictly limited: 
it is to ignore the particular impact of 
any teacher's exercise of his academic 
freedom upon the institution and to 
concern itself solely with the question 
of whether the teacher or scholar has 
been guilty of such an inexcusable 
breach of professional ethics as to war- 
rant his termination, the penalty of 
dismissal being appropriate only as a 
necessary means of vindicating the very 
functions which the system of academic 
freedom is itself meant to serve. 
For several reasons, largely related to 
the practical necessity of using local 
review committees, the judgment of 
these standing committees is not final. 
Against the chance that the committee 
members-themselves nearly always 
drawn from within the institution- 
may show undue favor from too close 
an identification with a colleague, an 
authority of limited review is recog- 
nized in the hierarchy of administra- 
tion. Against the chance that the 
committee members may show bias 
against him-as from fear for their own 
status, from a commitment to a given 
professional dogma, or from profes- 
sional envy or sheer personal dislike- 
a more generous appeal may lie through 
the hieararchy of administration and 
thereafter to other bodies-like the 
AAUP-and, on occasion at least, to 
the courts. Indeed, the academic mav- 
erick may sometimes need more protec- 
tion against the entrenched dogmas of 
his immediate peers than against any- 
one else, thus necessitating some right 
of appeal from a local judgment to the 
judgment of others who have less 
of a vested interest than they in the 
maintenance of a given "truth." 
This system does not always operate 
to accomplish the end for which it is 
designed, of course, as when a coinci- 
dence of prejudices-albeit often of 
different kinds-may operate against 
the faculty member at every level; but 
superior alternatives are not readily 
apparent. After all, no freedom, in- 
cluding even academic freedom, can 
claim exemption from some degree of 
accountability. Under current condi- 
tions of educational organization in 
the United States, we have yet to dis- 
cover a safer choice than to entrust 
that accountability in respect to the 
responsibilities of academicians in the 
first instance to professional peer groups 
within each institution, acting under the 
specific constraint of confining their 
review solely to an examination of the 
professional integrity of the manner in 
which the individual discharged his 
professional responsibilities. 
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Under more and less constraint 
This system, developed specifically 
for the maintenance of academic free- 
dom, obviously differs from that which 
generally prevails in ordinary employ- 
ment relations. Significantly, however, 
in respect to his academic freedom, the 
teacher or scholar is simultaneously 
under more constraint as well as under 
less constraint than would ordinarily 
obtain. Clearly he is under less con- 
straint, of course, to the extent that 
the standard is more protective of him 
than if it were the standard common 
to employment relationships in general; 
that is, Did he perform his assignment 
as directed by management, did he 
avoid any indiscretions clearly forbid- 
den by management, and has he other- 
wise conducted himself in a manner not 
injurious to the economic well-being of 
the enterprise? We have already noted 
that none of these considerations is per- 
missible where the committee concludes 
that the professions or conduct for 
which the faculty member has been 
called to account were otherwise within 
the prerogative of his academic free- 
dom. What is less obvious, however, 
is the one respect in which the exercise 
of academic freedom is also under con- 
siderably greater constraint than if the 
conduct in which it is implicated were 
governed only by ordinary standards of 
accountability to one's employer: as 
professional peers are admonished to be 
less concerned than the administration 
or trustees to consider any institutional 
repercussions resulting from what a 
given faculty member may have done 
professionally wholly consistent with 
the ethical use of his academic free- 
dom, they are admonished to be far 
more concerned than others in making 
certain of that ethical use. The price 
of an exceptional vocational freedom to 
speak the truth as one sees it, without 
penalty even for its possible immediate 
impact upon the economic well-being of 
the employing institution, is the cost 
of exceptional care in the representa- 
tion of that "truth," a professional 
standard of care. Indeed, a grave 
ethical failure in the integrity of a 
teacher's or scholar's academic repre- 
sentations, no matter of how little 
notice or coincidental concern it may 
happen to be to the particular institu- 
tional employer, is precisely the kind 
of offense to the contingent privilege 
of academic freedom which states a 
clearly adequate cause for a faculty 
recommendation of termination. The 
very reason for specially protecting the 
profession is itself frustrated, for in- 
stance, if experimental undertakings 
are knowingly falsified, or positions of 
professional responsibility are sought to 
be gained through false representations 
of originality-that is, plagiarism; it is 
of no consequence that neither offense 
may violate any general law, or that it 
may turn out to be a matter of indif- 
ference to a particular board of trus- 
tees. In either case, the trust of 
academic freedom has been violated 
and strict accountability is in order. 
In this way, then, academic freedom 
speaks directly and distinctly to the 
special critical role of the professional 
teacher and scholar. He is encouraged 
in the development of all of his aca- 
demically related activities to ply a bold 
and innovative critical acumen. On the 
other hand, he is accountable to those 
who share a like duty and a similar 
commitment as his own, to answer at 
a professional level for the ethical in- 
tegrity of his work so to establish 
by the fact of that integrity that he 
fully justifies the contingent privilege of 
academic freedom which he has claimed. 
The distinction of academic freedom 
from the general protection of free 
speech is precisely located in its im- 
mediate and indissoluble nexus with 
the cardinal social expectation laid 
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upon the particular profession with 
which it is identified-that there shall 
be a vocation to examine received 
learning and values critically, a voca- 
tion expected to do so and to make 
itself useful by the fact of disseminating 
its work. In this sense, it is the ele- 
ment of academic freedom which spe- 
cifically identifies the profession: It is 
simply contradictory to lay that expec- 
tation upon the profession and then to 
prevent its accomplishment by deter- 
ring its fulfillment through rules which 
punish its exercise. As Arthur Lovejoy, 
who helped to found the AAUP, cor- 
rectly observed: 
It [that is, the social function of academic 
freedom] is rendered impossible if the 
work of the investigator is shackled by 
the requirement that his conclusions shall 
never seriously deviate either from gen- 
erally accepted beliefs or from those ac- 
cepted by the persons, private or official, 
through whom society provides the means 
for the maintenance of universities.13 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A SUBSET OF 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: A 
COMPARISON WITH THE 
GENERAL ISSUE OF 
CIVIL LIBERTY 
As an identifiable subset of First 
Amendment freedoms, academic free- 
dom requires a significant modification 
in the standards of judicial review 
otherwise applicable to freedom of 
speech. Specifically, for instance, it 
clearly ought not be enough in a given 
case to uphold the discharge of a fac- 
ulty member that the state may have 
generally criminalized any use of por- 
nography, or that the university may 
have similarly presumed to forbid that 
use, even assuming that the material is 
not redeemed by standards the Supreme 
Court has otherwise developed in deter- 
13. Lovejoy, "Academic Freedom," Ency- 
clopaedia of the Social Sciences (1930), vol. 1, 
p. 384. 
mining whether sex-related material is 
protected by the First Amendment.14 
If it were true that even the hardest- 
core obscenity were being received, 
read, and shared with immediate pro- 
fessionally involved colleagues in what 
could be shown to be a professionally 
responsible study of the subject, the 
fact of the academic context is not ir- 
relevant to a determination of the case 
and may, indeed, be controlling. Pro- 
fessionally related efforts directed in 
good faith precisely to fulfill the social 
directive of the academic profession, 
that is, to examine received learning 
and values critically and to report the 
results without fear of reprisal, will 
make the case appropriate for the con- 
stitutional protection of academic free- 
dom when the absence of these ele- 
ments might otherwise spell its failure. 
There is, of course, nothing in this 
formulation that assumes that the First 
Amendment subset of academic free- 
doms is a total absolute, any more than 
freedom of speech is itself an exclusive 
value prized literally above all else. 
Thus, the false shouting of fire in a 
crowded theater may not immunize a 
professor of psychology from having to 
answer for the consequences of the en- 
suing panic, even assuming that he did 
it in order to observe crowd reaction 
first-hand and solely to advance the 
general enlightenment we may other- 
wise possess of how people act under 
great and sudden stress. It is to ob- 
serve, however, that the context of 
academic setting provides an additional 
constitutional consideration-the spe- 
cific consideration of academic free- 
dom-which may well be determinative 
14. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957); A Book Named "John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. At- 
torney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 
(1969); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 
(1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo- 
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). 
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under circumstances where a free speech 
claim would otherwise fail. Where 
other societal values are not so clearly 
conflicted by the particular manner in 
which academic freedom is exercised 
that the manner of that exercise can 
reasonably be described as profession- 
ally reprehensible-as would assuredly 
be true in the risking of human life in 
the "controlled experiment" to deter- 
mine how crowds react to panic-the 
law or institutional rule which oper- 
ates to abridge the exercise of that aca- 
demic freedom should be held invalid 
as applied to the particular case. In 
this sense, then, it is proper to speak 
specifically of academic freedoms as a 
subset of First Amendment rights and 
not to regard them as simply fungible 
with freedom of speech in general. 
Simultaneously, we are bound to ac- 
knowledge that when no claim of pro- 
fessional academic endeavor is present, 
neither can one lever himself into a 
preferred First Amendment position by 
invoking a claim of academic freedom. 
Granted that the proper characteriza- 
tion must sometimes be difficult and 
even elusive, we must admit that not 
all that a faculty member does in re- 
spect to his freedom of speech is a 
manifestation of professional endeavor. 
Indeed, a great deal of it is neither 
professional nor unprofessional-that is, 
done under professional auspices, but 
in a clearly unprofessional manner. 
Rather, it is simply aprofessional, and 
the distinction is not a trivial one: 
what is lost in respect to the special 
protection of academic freedom may be 
more than offset in a particular case by 
a different kind of gain-a gain in being 
freed from the special accounltability of 
academic freedom. 
We have hesitated to acknowledge 
the distinction between professional and 
aprofessional activity, even when the 
difference was abundantly clear, partly 
from an understandable anxiety that 
had we done so, that is, had we dis- 
pensed with the academic freedom claim, 
we might then have been without a 
place to stand in defending the faculty 
member or in reproving the institution 
that sought to dismiss him. In this, I 
think we have been mistaken and that 
the proper place to stand is the same 
place occupied by so many others-on 
the general issue of civil liberties and 
the just limitations on the relational 
authority of institutions. It was just 
this principle, for instance, that Presi- 
dent Lowell reflected in risking the loss 
to Harvard of a ten-million-dollar be- 
quest, which was threatened to be an- 
nulled unless an openly pro-German 
professor was deprived of his chair. 
What is so instructive of the episode is 
that Lowell did not state his position 
in terms of claiming that what the pro- 
fessor had done was an exercise of aca- 
demic freedom. Indeed, had Lowell 
done so, presumably he would then 
have felt called upon to say a great deal 
more, to justify the faculty member's 
utterances as sufficiently restrained, 
rigorous, and consistent with profes- 
sional integrity, as not to call into 
question his ability to continue at Har- 
vard. Eschewing this approach, Lowell 
declared instead: 
If a university or college censors what its 
professors may say, if it restrains them 
from uttering something it does not ap- 
prove, it hereby assumes responsibility for 
that which it permits them to say. This is 
logical and inevitable. If the university is 
right in restraining its professors, it has a 
duty to do so, and it is responsible for 
whatever it permits. There is no middle 
ground. Either the university assumes 
full responsibility for permitting its pro- 
fessors to express certain opinions in pub- 
lic, or it assumes no responsibility what- 
ever, and leaves them to be dealt with like 
other citizens by the public authorities 
according to the laws of the land.15 
15. Recounted and discussed in R. Hof- 
stadter and W. Metzger, The Development of 
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It is perfectly clear that Lowell was 
himself making an implicit distinction 
between alleged abuses of academic 
freedom-for which Harvard would 
doubtless admit its responsibility of 
review of its own faculty-and alleged 
abuses of free speech and the general 
issue of civil liberty. The distinction is 
eminently correct and must not be 
placed in jeopardy by what may now 
be seen as the pyrrhic success of having 
extended the claim of academic freedom 
in a manner that invites more, rather 
than less, institutional monitoring of 
general civil liberties. 
It is an altogether congenial develop- 
ment in our constitutional law that the 
Supreme Court has come to essentially 
the same conclusion in respect to the 
general civil liberties of those who 
teach: that at least where there is no 
affectation of professional endeavor in 
the aprofessional expressions of a fac- 
ulty member-and no false trading upon 
his institutional affiliation-there is 
correspondingly no sufficient justifica- 
tion for the institution to presume to 
review the conduct of the faculty mem- 
ber by the more taxing fiduciary stan- 
dard of professional care. Thus, should 
one be moved even casually to write a 
letter to the editor expressing his senti- 
ment on some political issue of the day, 
it is entirely unjust for the institution 
that employs him to call his profes- 
sional integrity into question according 
to that standard of carefulness and rigor 
that may appropriately qualify his pro- 
fessional undertakings and the contin- 
gent special protection of academic 
freedom. Indeed, to do so is in fact to 
disadvantage him in his prerogatives as 
a citizen, as the Supreme Court noted 
in Pickering v. Board of Education: 
What we do have before us is a case in 
which a teacher had made erroneous state- 
Academic Freedom in the United States (New 
York: Columbia U.P., 1955). 
ments [in a public newspaper] upon issues 
then currently the subject of public atten- 
tion, which are critical of his ultimate em- 
ployer but which are neither shown nor 
can be presumed to have in any way 
either impeded the teacher's proper per- 
formance of his daily duties in the class- 
room or to have interfered with the regular 
operations of the schools generally. In 
these circumstances we conclude that the 
interest of the school administration in 
limiting teachers' opportunities to contrib- 
ute to public debate is not significantly 
greater than its interest in limiting a simi- 
lar contribution by any member of the 
general public.16 
This "First Amendment" view of the 
matter seems to me to be entirely sound 
and desirably free from the false 
freight of special accountability which 
attached itself whenever we tried in- 
stead to justify the aprofessional expres- 
sions of faculty members as an act of 
academic freedom, rather than as an 
unexceptional claim to the equal pro- 
tection of freedom of speech. As a 
valid principle which is clearly to be 
commended as a reasonable standard of 
self-restraint for all institutions of 
higher learning, moreover, there is no 
basis for us to hold it less applicable to 
private institutions than to public ones. 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 1940 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 
If there is any inhibition which cur- 
rently restrains the AAUP from main- 
taining that the aprofessional activities 
of faculty members are not subject to 
institutional review by the same fidu- 
ciary responsibility for which they may 
16. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). For more extended 
analyses of Pickering, see O'Neil, "Public 
Employment, Antiwar Protest, and Prein- 
duction Review," U.C.L.A. Law Review 17 
(1970), pp. 1028, 1040-53; W. Van Alstyne, 
"The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and 
Professors," Duke Law Journal (1970), pp. 
841, 848-54. 
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be asked to account through academic 
due process in respect to their academic 
freedom, it may be thought to arise 
from the troubling ambiguity of the 
following paragraph from the 1940 
Statement of Principles: 
The college or university teacher is a citi- 
zen, a member of a learned profession, and 
an officer of an educational institution. 
When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he 
should be free from institutional censor- 
ship or discipline, but his special position 
in the community imposes special obliga- 
tions. As a man of learning and an educa- 
tional officer, he should remember that the 
public may judge his profession and his 
institution by his utterances. Hence he 
should at all times be accurate, should ex- 
ercise appropriate restraint, should show 
respect for the opinion of others, and 
should make every effort to indicate that 
he is not an institutional spokesman. 
(Emphasis added.)17 
If this paragraph were taken as a state- 
ment of professional aspiration ad- 
dressed to the good sense and esprit of 
the academic fraternity, it might well 
be thought to state a highly commend- 
able view. If it is a statement which 
means to encourage institutional review 
-and possible dismissal-of faculty 
members because aprofessional utter- 
ances may sometimes lack the degree 
of accuracy and restraint not improp- 
erly expected of their professional en- 
deavors, however, it is radically unfair 
to the equal civil liberties of academics 
and needs to be revised. As it happens, 
neither of these alternatives quite de- 
scribes the present situation. 
A clarification was provided of the 
critical "but" clause in 1963, in the 
course of a Committee A review of a 
case involving an assistant professor's 
letter to the editor of a student news- 
paper published and distributed at the 
17. Reprinted in AAUP Policy Documents 
and Reports 2 (1971). 
University of Illinois.18 The ad hoc 
investigating committee of the AAUP 
read the critical clause of the 1940 
statement exclusively as an admonition 
addressed to the professional conscience 
of the faculty alone: 
The ad hoc committee is of the opinion 
that . . . as applied to a faculty member 
having definite or indefinite tenure, mak- 
ing public utterances on matters of general 
concern to the community, the standard of 
"academic responsibility" is not a valid 
basis for reprimand, dismissal, or other 
official discipline.19 
Nevertheless, the plurality opinion for 
Committee A disagreed. From its as- 
sessment of the legislative history of 
the 1940 statement, it concluded that 
the "but" clause was not a precatory 
statement; rather, the clause was in- 
tended to recognize the legitimacy of 
university authority to discipline fac- 
ulty members for violating norms of 
accuracy, self-restraint, and courtesy 
even in respect to professionally unre- 
lated extramural utterances: 
In light of Committee A's understanding 
of the 1940 Statement, together with the 
legislative history of the document and its 
"interpretation," the Committee disagrees 
with the authors of the report that "the 
notion of academic responsibility, when the 
faculty member is speaking as a citizen, is 
intended to be an admonition rather than 
a standard for the application of disci- 
pline.20 
Left alone, this position would appear 
to embrace the most self-effacing-and 
simultaneously self-righteous-position 
of all. The fact that Committee A 
went on to stress the ameliorative in- 
fluence of academic due process in such 
cases-and to disapprove the particu- 
lar dismissal of the faculty member as 
18. See "Report on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure: The University of Illinois," A.A.U.P. 
Bulletin 49 (1963), pp. 25ff. 
19. Ibid., p. 36. 
20. Ibid., p. 41. 
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"outrageously severe and completely 
unwarranted" under the circumstances 
-does little to relieve one's objection 
to the interpretation itself as a matter 
of sound principle. On the one hand, 
it appears to forswear any special claim 
of academic freedom in respect to a 
faculty member's personal prerogative 
of general public discussion "when he 
speaks or writes as a citizen," and not 
under pretense or claim of professional 
endeavor. At the same time, it appears 
simultaneously to accept the legitimacy 
of institutional restraint even in respect 
to such ordinary political rhetoric by 
the exceptionally inhibiting standards 
of accuracy, care, restraint, and cour- 
tesy identified with the individual's pro- 
fessional status, that is, with his status 
"as a man of learning and an educa- 
tional officer." In this respect, the 
trade-off the AAUP appeared to have 
accepted with the Association of Ameri- 
can Colleges in 1940-namely, to culti- 
vate public confidence in the profes- 
sion by laying down a professionally 
taxing standard of institutional account- 
ability for all utterances of a public 
character made by a member of the 
profession-is substantially more inhib- 
iting of a faculty member's civil free- 
dom of speech than any standard that 
government is constitutionally privi- 
leged to impose in respect to the per- 
sonal political or social utterances of 
other kinds of public employees. 
Immediately subsequent to its report 
in 1963-but consistent with other por- 
tions of that report-however, Com- 
mittee A adopted a more strict construc- 
tion of the 1940 statement. This strict 
construction disarms that statement to 
a considerable extent and brings it, as 
thus construed, much closer to the posi- 
tion the Supreme Court adopted on 
First Amendment grounds in 1969: 
The controlling principle is that a faculty 
member's expression of opinion as a citizen 
cannot constitute grounds for dismissal 
unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty 
member's unfitness for his position. Ex- 
tramural utterances rarely bear upon the 
faculty member's fitness for his position. 
Moreover, a final decision should take into 
account the faculty member's entire record 
as a teacher and scholar. In the absence of 
weighty evidence of unfitness, the adminis- 
tration should not prefer charges; if it is 
not clearly proved in the hearing that the 
faculty member is unfit for his position, 
the faculty committee should make a find- 
ing in favor of the faculty member con- 
cerned.21 
Even conceding that this Committee A 
construction may go nearly as far as 
the AAUP can proceed in light of the 
phrasing and legislative history of the 
1940 statement, it remains subject to 
criticism.22 One step that may easily 
be taken is the more emphatic clarifica- 
tion of the standard of institutional re- 
view-assuming that such review is 
ever called for, or at least that the 1940 
statement, unless amended, provides for 
the possibility-in cases where no claim 
of academic freedom is asserted and no 
willful trading upon professional status 
has been involved in the personal activ- 
ity of a faculty member whose institu- 
tional position is thereby drawn into 
question by the character of the activ- 
ity. 
What needs to be done, however, is 
21. Committee A Statement on Extramural 
Utterances (1964), reprinted in AAUP Policy 
Documents and Reports 14 (1971). See also 
"Advisory Letter from the Washington Office," 
A.A.U.P. Bulletin 49 (1963), pp. 393, 394, 
and the discussion in "Report on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure: The University of 
California at Los Angeles," A.A.U.P. Bulletin 
57 (1971), pp. 382, 394-400, 404, 405. 
22. See, for example, Remarks by President 
J. W. Maucker of the University of Northern 
Iowa (on the occasion of receiving the Tenth 
Alexander Meiklejohn Award), A.A.U.P. Bul- 
letin 54 (1968), pp. 251, 253-54; Schier, "Aca- 
demic Freedom and Political Action," A.A.U.P. 
Bulletin 53 (1967), p. 22. 
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not merely to make clearer that a fac- 
ulty member may not properly be held 
to answer to an institution for the in- 
tegrity of his general utterances by the 
same standard by which he may have 
to account for his academic freedom, 
but to enlarge upon the implication of 
our position that his substantive ac- 
countability for such utterances will 
ordinarily not run to the institution at 
all. For an alleged abuse of freedom of 
speech, general provisions of law are 
available to provide for measures of re- 
dress and sanction so far as it has been 
thought both safe and just to allow. As 
a consequence, society may not expect, 
nor should the standards of the AAUP 
contemplate, that recourse for alleged 
abuses of ordinary civil liberty may be 
compounded by the gratuitous use of 
institutional disciplinary processes. It 
may be conceded that circumstances 
will sometimes arise where the personal 
conduct of a faculty member may so 
immediately involve the regular opera- 
tion of the institution itself or otherwise 
provide firm ground for an internal 
grievance that internal recourse, con- 
sistent with academic due process, is 
offensive neither to the general protec- 
tion of civil liberty nor to the standards 
of this Association. Decisions such as 
that in the Pickering case are instruc- 
tive, however, that this exception is not 
nearly so broad as the presumption of 
custom has supposed. 
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